There were a few times in our conversations that Mr. T warned me of what I see on-site at the DMZ.  “These are one-sided stories,” he said a few times.  He grew up in the south, and he has known the country’s narrative before North Vietnam took power.  Not to say that the young Vietnamese have no understanding of communist propaganda, but Mr. T certainly was very aware, and I also sensed disdain, of the “official” versions of the events.

With this in mind I marched into the Khe Sanh Combat Base with a necessary dose of skepticism.  For I would be seeing some exhibits at the museum there.

The Khe Sanh Combat Base

The Khe Sanh Combat Base lies south of the DMZ and 65km west of Dong Ha, along Route 9.  It is part of the Quang Tri Province.  Route 9 was a major supply route, as well as a smuggling trail, between Vietnam and Laos.  And Khe Sanh is located just 19km east of the border with Laos.  Although the Khe Sanh Combat Base is accessible by land and air transport, Route 9 was a very narrow path in those days.  Trucks had to move very slowly along Route 9.  As a result, air cargo also served as a major means of supply for the military there.

During the early days of the war, Khe Sanh was the location where American troops could spy on the activities of the North Vietnamese troops in the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail.  It was also believed that, if Khe Sanh was attacked, it would serve as the warning for imminent attacks on South Vietnam.  As such, the U.S. troops made significant improvements to the war machinery at Khe Sanh between 1964 and 1967.  There were efforts to improve Route 9, to build a new base, to install more weaponry such as rocket launchers and mortars, and to reinforce the bunkers and trenches etc (Worth at 64).

At some point, General Westmoreland thought that Khe Sanh could eventually become the base from which the U.S. can launch an invasion to Laos, resulting in a cut-off of the North Vietnamese’ support route.  Id.

The Strategic and Historic Significance of Khe Sanh

Khe Sanh would not be new to those familiar with the history of the Vietnam War, for the Battle of Khe Sanh, along with the subsequent Tet Offensive in 1968, would become the turning point in America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, leading to the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam.  Yet Khe Sanh’s strategic importance was gradually built up over the earlier years of the war.

In 1967, U.S. troops in Khe Sanh began to engage in a series of assaults with the North Vietnamese troops in the area.  Both sides struggled to maintain stronghold in the hilly areas surrounding the Khe Sanh Combat Base.  There was regular patrol in the area to seek out North Vietnamese positions.  Battles occurred in the nearby Hills 861, 881 South, and 950, where two sides fought for the control of strategic positions.  (Worth 65-69)

Photo: A map of Khe Sanh and the surrounding hills, identifiable by numbers.

At some point in 1967, the North Vietnamese closed Route 9.  This has resulted in a cutoff of supplying route by land for the base.  Air transport thus became the only source of supply to the base.  Tensions were already building up then.

Besides the transport of supplies, the mode of operation at Khe Sanh was also heavily reliant on the air force.  At many of the assaults in 1967 over the control of the surrounding hills, air force reinforcements were the decisive factor for driving out North Vietnamese troops.  Inevitably, however, some American lives were lost to friendly fires as well.  The same mode of operation, with the B-52 Operation Arc Light, would also turn out to be vital during the Battle of Khe Sanh.

The perceived importance of the Khe Sanh Combat Base to the American command resulted in the continuous effort to fortify, protect and defend it, perhaps at an exceptional cost.  That is, up till the Tet Offensive of 1968.

The Battle of Khe Sanh

The Battle of Khe Sanh took place between January 21 and July 9, 1968.  There were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps at the base, with support from the United States Army and the United States Air Force.  A small number of ARVN forces (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was also there.  On the other hand, the PAVN (North Vietnamese’s People’s Army of Vietnam) sent two to three divisions to Khe Sanh.  One of the divisions was the famous 304^th Division, which in the 1950s “had participated in the decisive Communist victory [against the French] at Dien Bien Phu.” (Worth at 69).

To put it in perspective, the Communist forces outnumbered the marines by three times.

General Westmoreland had long anticipated a major offensive at Khe Sanh.  He thought that the United States could score a strategic advantage at Khe Sanh by launching the latest U.S. military technology on a large number of North Vietnamese forces.  Because of Khe Sanh’s isolation, heavy air strike campaigns there would hardly result in civilian casualties.  He responded to the looming military buildup there with Operation Niagara.  Phase I, which came during the third week of January, came with an intense surveillance of the North Vietnamese positions in the area, then followed by a series of heavy air strikes and involving the B-52 Bomber, to destroy the PAVN forces in Niagara II, on January 21.

The North Vietnamese came prepared, however.  Besides the strength of their numbers, they also launched mortar barrage and dynamites at the surrounding hills, where the marines had previously secured control.  The bombardments were consistent and caused significant casualties on both sides.  The PAVN was aiming to surround the Khe Sanh Combat Base and isolate it.  This might have been intended to create a Dien Bien Phu type of scenario.  (For more on Dien Bien Phu, the decisive battle of the Viet Minh that would lead to the end of the French occupation of Vietnam, see Wikipedia entry here).

Of course, the North Vietnamese also did attack the combat base itself.  The first successful attack set off explosions at the ammunition dump at the base.  The marines lost thousands of shells.  And surely, there would be many more sustained shelling, artillery and rocket fires, and mortar rounds to come.

The PAVN had managed to advance closer to the base, and they were digging trenches for further assault, attempting to put Khe Sanh under siege.  The Marines held on, with support from the air strikes.

A historian has named the U.S. bombings in Khe Sanh “the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare.”  (Wikipedia)

Drawing the Curtains on Khe Sanh

In April, in Operation Pegasus, as a relief mission, a combined Marine—Army/ARVN task force broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh.  Route 9, as approached from the east, was reopened again.  With this, the U.S. Command considered the defense of Khe Sanh to be successful.

In June 1968, Operation Charlie began as the evacuation of the Khe Sanh Base.  The abandonment of the Khe Sanh Combat Base entailed the destruction and removal of equipment and the evacuation of staff.  Battles with the PAVN continued throughout Operation Charlie.  These incidents slowed down the pace of final withdrawal.  On July 13, Ho Chi Minh, in his telegraph to President Nguyen Huu To and comrades, declared Khe Sanh a victory.  And not only that, it was characterized as one that “paved the way for greater victories.”

The sudden abandonment of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, especially after the U.S. defended it so fiercely for 77 days, naturally raised concerns.  The Saigon Command’s reply to journalist questions simply stated that “the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary.” (Wikipedia)

The Casualties

Attacks continued throughout the time that the United States closed down and evacuated from the Khe Sanh Combat Base.  It would then take until July of 1968, when U.S. troops withdrew from Hill 689, that the curtains are drawn on Khe Sanh.

The Wikipedia has a very thorough account on the Battle of Khe Sanh.  In terms of damage, I quote directly from it:

“Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh.  This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily — 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh.  Marine analysis of PAVN artillery fire estimated that the PAVN gunners had fired 10,908 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions during the battle.”

It has been raised by historians that, the attacks that occurred between the beginning of Operation Pegasus and for ten weeks after have resulted in “more than twice the casualties officially reported during the siege.”  (Brush)

Both sides have the incentive to lie, or to willfully undercount, the KIA (killed in action) numbers; and surely they also exaggerate the body counts of enemies killed.  The official U.S. figures claim that only a few hundred died as a result of the Battle of Khe Sanh.  The “undercounting” resulted from the exclusion of several operations before the marines’ final withdrawal in July 1968.

For example, the deaths from the relief mission Operation Pegasus onwards had not been included into the official KIA number.  U.S. historians have put the total KIA at Khe Sanh to be 1,000.  U.S. figures also estimate 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese deaths from the conflict.

As for the North Vietnamese claims, at least at the Khe Sanh museum visitors are shown this figure:

Decimated and captured 11,900 enemy soldiers.

Destroyed 78 military vehicles.

Shot down and destroyed 197 airplanes of various types.

Destroyed 80 ships. 

And Tet

Certainly, the severity of the battles at Khe Sanh was a war drama of its own.  Yet the Battle of Khe Sanh broke out just nine days before the surprised Tet Offensive.  The relationship between the two became a viable academic subject for years to come.

General Westmoreland has always held firm on Khe Sanh.  He was not going to lose the combat base to the North Vietnamese.  That is even if they were launching other significant offenses in the overarching conflict.  His view was that the Tet Offensive was a tactic to distract the United States from Khe Sanh.

The most perplexing issue that historians struggle with is the strategic importance of the Battle of Khe Sanh for the North Vietnamese.  Now that we knew that the Tet Offensive was going to follow the Battle of Khe Sanh, what were the Vietnamese hoping to achieve by attacking Khe Sanh ten days before the Tet Offensive?

I am no historian, but the exhibits at the Khe Sanh Museum contains some telltale references.  Entitled The Resolution of the Standing Committee June 1966, the exhibit states

Creating a new direction for our attack on the enemy’s weak spot on southern battlefields, forcing them to disperse their force into the jungle battlefield, conducting decimation to the enemy strategic mobile units by our northern regular forces, creating favorable conditions for other fronts, especially for Tri-Thien plain area, making the enemy more than passive preventing their plot from expanding the ground war to the North, especially our military zone IV. 

This litany of reasons show the perceived importance of Khe Sanh to the North Vietnamese.  However, the Wikipedia does cite specific sources, with General Giap, the mastermind of the North Vietnamese military, saying “that Khe Sanh itself was not of importance, but only a diversion to draw U.S. forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam.”

Ultimately, the fact that the PAVN had never cut off the water supply or telephone lines of the Khe Sanh Combat Base seemed to suggest that there was not a serious intention of overtaking Khe Sanh completely.  But this battle did engage the full attention of General Westmoreland, throughout the time of the Tet Offensive.  Perhaps then as a diversion tactic the Battle of Khe Sanh had served its intended purpose for the North Vietnamese.

Relics of the War at Khe Sanh

My time at the Khe Sanh Combat Base was, surprisingly, reflective.  The weaponry that remains there is a sobering reminder of the terrors of war.  The planes and the choppers there were of such size that they dwarfed me completely. It certainly induces a humbling realisation.  Hundreds of these once hovered the skies of Vietnam, causing thousands of lives lost on both sides.  This surely was the price paid, but for what?

The Battle of Khe Sanh, along with the Tet Offensive, would eventually cause the United States’ final withdrawal from Vietnam.  But the war did not end there.  It would drag on into the 1970s, until the North took power over the whole nation in 1975.

Without military training, one cannot fully appreciate the significance of the war relics on display at the former Khe Sanh Combat Base, especially that there were no explanations on-site telling visitors what they were.  It makes sense, however, as the site was the combat base of the enemy.

Perhaps then the best I can do is to simply show the photographs here and let them speak for themselves instead.

The Museum

Right, and there is propaganda there.

The captions of many of the exhibits show typical Communist-style history writing.  I did take some time to read them, however, because they do convey the perspectives of the North Vietnamese.

The idea of truth, at least in terms of the American War in Vietnam, is perhaps more complex than a black-and-white distinction between “the propaganda of the communist regime” and “the truth as told by the capitalist south.”  When studying the Vietnam War, one should bear in mind that neither side, plus none of the third parties involved, have the intention to convey the whole truth.  This is so especially for the Battle of Khe Sanh, where both the United States and the North Vietnamese claimed victory, and conveyed it as such to their own peoples.

For the Americans, the versions of the Vietnam War as told to them at the time of the Battle of Khe Sanh  was similarly distorted by the upbeat messages that U.S. Command and the administration constructed.

It does take hard work to unpack the perspectives of the United States, the then South Vietnamese, Vietnam’s Communist regime, China and the Soviet Union.  Perhaps most importantly, consider the perspectives of the Vietnamese people.  Their voices are often buried in the currents of history.

The Coffee of Khe Sanh

Khe Sanh is now a place of banana and coffee plantation.  Yet even this development had not come easy.  The severe air strike campaigns during the Battle of Khe Sanh had resulted in serious soil contamination in this area.  It took decades before the soil became good enough for vegetation again.

Mr. T invited me to buy some of the local products there.  I was very happy to have the second cup of coffee for the day.  And this cup of coffee would have to last me until the very late lunch at the Vinh Moc Tunnels.

Sources

Richard Worth, Battles That Changed the World: Tet Offensive (2022) at 62-77.

Mitchell K. Hall, The Vietnam War (2018).

The Wikipedia on the Battle of Khe Sanh.

Mark Bowden, Hue 1968, the Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam (2017).

The Wikipedia on the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Historic Descriptions On-Site at the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

Conor Friedersdorf, The Battle of Khe Sanh and Its Retellings, The Atlantic, January 27, 2018, available here.

Peter Brush, Recounting the Casualties at Khe Sanh, Internet Archive: Way Back Machine, available here.

I guess people in Asia tend to think that those who speak fair English are from Singapore.  Despite my initial introduction, Mr. T mistook me for a Singaporean a few times in our conversation.  Although I did not insist on this point, I said that I identify as American.  I did look Chinese to him, however, so in our chats I asked him questions about the Vietnamese people’s views on both China and America.  Both present somewhat sensitive issues in Vietnam’s foreign relations.

The Rockpile

Soon enough, we came to an open view of the Rockpile.

The Rockpile is a rocky hill that rises above from the Cam Lo River bottom.  At 240 metres in height, it provided a good vantage point for military purposes in the vicinity.  Located about 16 km from the southernmost border of the DMZ and 26 km west of Dong Ha, the hill overlooks an area with “several major infiltration routes from North Vietnam and Laos.”  At this height, the Rockpile also enables the observation of the South China Sea in the east.  As such, the Rockpile has served as the outpost for anti-infiltration surveillance for the United States during the American War.

In 1966, the U.S. military launched Operation Hastings to drive out the North Vietnamese in the area and overtook the Rockpile.  Between 1966-1969, the United States Army and the Marine Corps used it as an observation post and artillery base.  In 1970-1971, the U.S. military patrolled the Rockpile, Dong Ha and DMZ areas.  In addition, the hill was a good location to monitor movements around the Khe Sanh Combat Base, Ca Lu Combat Base, and Camp Carroll.   It was also believed that the surveillance involved the interception of radio transmission from North Vietnam.  The Rockpile had an official name as the Elliot Combat Base.

The operation of the observation post relied heavily upon helicopters, for the hill itself is inaccessible to human traffic.  These helicopters would land on the top of the hill.  The U.S. military also installed radars and metal detectors on the hill to detect the North Vietnamese army, especially because they often ambushed in the jungle.  Once they discovered movements by the North Vietnamese military, they would bomb them.

One cannot miss the distinctive shape of the Rockpile.  According to the Wikipedia, a Marine described the hill as “toothpick-type mountain stuck out in the middle of an open area with a sheer cliff straight up and down.”  The plateau-like summit of the Rockpile enabled helicopter landing.

The Wikipedia has a very thorough introduction of the Rockpile.  Please visit the link below.

When we stopped there, there was another group tour.  Leading the tour was a young Vietnamese woman speaking good English.  I gathered from their conversation that Mr. T was more knowledgeable.  I was just thankful that I got to meet Mr. T for this tour.  Because he lived the experience of the very war itself, he spoke with a moving conviction.  Dates, places, people, stories, views, perspectives – coming from Mr. T they seem to bear a weightiness, a burden in the soul, that a young tour guide would not be able to convey naturally.

Sources

The Wikipedia on the Rockpile.